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Abstract—Online social search brings forth a new way to
harness the Internet for answers. However, the personal and
often sensitive information is unwittingly exposed to others when
a person looks for an expert via the underlying social network.
In this paper, we propose a model in which a node’s behavior of
looking for an expert is adjusted by his awareness of the potential
expertise of his contacts. We derive the optimal distribution
of nodes’ awareness level that minimizes the system’s privacy
exposure, and prove that it corresponds to the unique Nash
equilibrium. Our analysis shows that the optimal distribution
over a posed question is inversely proportional to the square root
of the corresponding expertise density.
I. INTRODUCTION
Web search engine became popular since the last decade
when there was a great deal of online content that could
be indexed. Today, there are many humans who can be
indexed, bringing forth a new way to harness the Internet
for answers. Seeking answers in this context is based on the
recent flourishing of online social networks (OSN). We refer
to the OSN-based information search as online social search
(OSS). Compared with searching for an answer on the Web
which may yield scattershot results, asking a human expert
from your small world [1] often gives you more subjective
or tailored-made recommendations. Thus OSS utilizes the
underlying network structure of OSNs to look for experts [2]
via friends, and friends of friends. In turn, the answer emerges
from people we trust, or people trusted by those we trust [3],
whose collective expertise will likely be much higher than that
of the relatively few people we happen to know personally.
OSS has received attention in both research [4] and actual
applications [5].
However, OSNs with millions of willing participants are
no longer niche phenomena [6]. While a question is passed
on along multi-step chains of acquaintances, the personal and
often sensitive information is also unwittingly exposed to
friends as well as strangers. In this paper, we investigate how
social context affects the revelation of OSS users’ personal
information. In particular, we look at the amount of private
information that is exposed in a referral session when a person
looks for answers to a specific question. A referral session
refers to the process from when a question is injected into the
system until an answer is found. The privacy exposure here
concerns the number of references a question is directed to
in a referral session. Distinct from anonymous remailer [7] or
anonymity network [8] which forwards messages concealing
the senders’ and the routers’ identifying information, OSS
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applications require revealing a user’s real identity. Therefore,
when a question is passed along chains of acquaintances, the
questioner’s personal information accompanying his identity
is also exposed to the intermediate nodes in the chains,
and the more references receiving a question, the higher the
questioner’s privacy exposure.
How to properly forward a question to an appropriate
expert is non-trivial, as one is confronted with the trade-
off between forwarding the question to as many contacts as
possible (e.g. flooding), and hence straining the willingness
of possible responders [9], and forwarding them to a more
compact set of contacts, thus missing an appropriate expert.
Considering the above trade-off, in this paper, instead of
having a referral agent flood questions to all its contacts
or send them to a predetermined set of contacts, we utilize
random walk to model a node’s referral strategy (Section II).
Since a node in a real OSS application maintains its local
social network and directs a question only to those who are
most likely to have an answer, we equip the nodes in our
model with the intelligence of awareness, assuming every
node is aware of the potential expertise of his contacts, and
the capacity of a node’s awareness towards another node is
limited. Consequently, the behavior of looking for a reference
is adjusted by this social context. Based on the model, we
study how the distribution of nodes’ awareness level R affects
the exposure of nodes’ privacy (Section III). In particular, to
minimize the system’s privacy exposure degree (PED), we
derive the optimal distribution of nodes’ awareness level in
terms of the percentage of nodes that may have appropriate
answers to the posed questions in the system (namely, expert
density), and prove that the optimal distribution constitutes the
unique Nash equilibrium. The analysis shows that the optimal
distribution over a posed question is inversely proportional
to the square root of the corresponding expert density. We
also analyze the performance bounds of the system’s minimal
privacy exposure degree with heterogeneous settings of the
number of a node’s contacts. To empirically study the system,
we apply the modeled referral strategy to the crawled data
of a set of OSNs [10] with various settings (Section IV). The
simulation result validates our analyses, and further shows that
the underlying network connectivity has a negative relationship
with the system’s privacy exposure. Finally, we conclude this
study with suggestions for future work (Section V).
II. MODELING
In this section, we model the nodes’ behavior of looking for
references. We first present the assumptions, definitions, and
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the question we study in the system, followed by the referral
strategy of a node.
A. Assumption and definition
We consider an OSN as an undirected graph G(V, E), where
V is the set of nodes (OSN users) and E ⊆ V × V is the
set of edges (social ties) in the network. Each edge means
one-hop question-forwarding is possible between the pair of
nodes. Let n = |V| be the number of users in the system.
We also denote by Nu ⊆ V the set of neighbors of nodes u,
and du = |Nu| the number of users in this set. Since a node
maintains its local social network, we equip the nodes in our
model with the intelligence of awareness, assuming every node
is aware of the potential expertise of his neighbors. We denote
by Su(v, i) a node u’s awareness of its neighbor v’s expertise,
with respect to question i. Su(v, i) takes one of three possible
values {−1, 0, 1}, such that
Su(v, i) 
⎧⎨
⎩
1, u knows v is an expert on i,
−1, u knows v is not an expert on i,
0, otherwise.
The above assumption studies the simplest case that classifies
nodes’ awareness into three types. In other words, for every
question i, we divide a node’s neighbors into three possible
sets. Nodes in the first set are regarded as experts on question
i, and those in the second set are considered as not holding
relevant answers to question i, and the rest of the neighbors
are those that the node is uncertain about whether they are
expert on i.
DEFINITION 1. The awareness level of neighbors’ exper-
tise in question i is defined as
ri 
δi∑
u∈V du
, where
δi = |{euv|v ∈ Nu and Su(v, i) = 0, for all u ∈ V}|.
euv in the above definition refers to the directed edge from
node u to its neighbor v. We consider directed edge since,
unlike a social tie between two people which represents the
fact that the two people know each other, awareness here
describes to what extent a person unilaterally feels whether he
knows the expertise of another person on a particular question,
and may not be symmetric. Thus ri refers to the percentage
of the directed edges among nodes that satisfy Su(v, i) = 0.
In other words, ri is the probability that node u knows the
potential expertise of node v, either “v is an expert on question
i” or “v is a layman (not an expert) on question i”, for each
v ∈ Nu.
In this paper, we study the steady state of OSS and assume
that there are in total m posed questions in the system. We
denote by R = [r1, r2, ..., rm] the distribution of nodes’
awareness level over m posed questions. Since in a practical
system the capacity1 of a node’s awareness of another node’s
1In reality, we also mean the social familiarity from a person to another is
limited.
expertise is limited, we set the constraint
m∑
i=1
ri = c,
and the constant c represents the average capacity of a node’s
awareness towards another node.
DEFINITION 2. The expert density on question i is defined
as
ei 
li
n
,
where li > 0 refers to the number of people that have relevant
answers to question i in the system. We also denote by E =
[e1, e2, ..., em] the expert density distribution over m posed
questions.
DEFINITION 3. The privacy exposure degree of a referral
session for Question i, denoted by PED(i), is defined as
the expected number of nodes Question i has visited before
it reaches an expert on it.
We consider the above definition due to the fact that when a
question is passed on along chains of friends, the questioner’s
personal and often sensitive information (i.e. at least the
question itself) is also exposed to the intermediate nodes in
the chains. We further denote the system’s privacy exposure
degree as PED, where PED = 1m ·
∑m
i=1 PED(i), i.e., it is
the average privacy exposure in the system.
Based on the above definitions, we attempt to answer the
following questions: How does the distribution of nodes’
awareness level R affect the exposure of nodes’ privacy?
Given the expert density distribution E and the nodes’ aware-
ness capacity c, what is the optimal R which minimizes the
system’s privacy exposure degree PED?
B. Referring strategy
Here, from a node’s perspective, we introduce the referral
strategy we utilize in this paper. If a node that receives
Question i has expertise in i, it responds to the node that
poses i with an answer, and this referral session is considered
successful; otherwise, it checks to see whether some of its
neighbors are potential experts on i and, if so, forwards i
to a randomly selected expert neighbor (i.e. pick a member
from that set uniformly with equal probability). If there are
no expert neighbors on i, it forwards i randomly to one of its
neighbors excluding those who are are not experts on i, and
if there are no neighbors of this category, the referral session
is considered failed.
In [11], we have analyzed the single step success rate of a
referral session with the above strategy. The probability that
a referral to an expert on Question i is satisfied at one step
from node u is
qi = 1− (1− ei)(1− riei)du (1)
III. PRIVACY EXPOSURE OPTIMIZATION
In this section, we study the effect of nodes’ awareness
distribution over different questions on the exposure of the
questioners’ privacy. In the system, heterogeneous setting of
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d (the number of neighbors of a node) of each node leads to
heterogenous success rate at each step, which complicates the
analysis. To obtain a clear vision of the privacy exposure prob-
lem of the modeled referral strategy of OSS, we first consider
the homogeneous setting of d and then the heterogenous case.
A. Optimization
Our goal is to find the system’s optimal awareness distri-
bution R, given E , such that the system’s minimal privacy
exposure degree PEDmin can be achieved with the capacity
limit of nodes’ awareness towards their neighbors. That is, to
minimize
PED(E ,R) = 1
m
·
m∑
i=1
PED(i) (2)
subject to a constraint of R:
m∑
i=1
ri = c (3)
where c is a given constant.
THEOREM 1. The optimal distribution of nodes’ aware-
ness level that minimizes the system’s privacy exposure degree
satisfies
ri ∝
√
1
ei∑m
j=1
√
1
ej
, i = 1, ...,m (4)
and the minimal privacy exposure degree is
PEDmin = γ
( m∑
i=1
√
1
ei
)2
(5)
where γ is a system-dependent constant.
Proof: Statistical analogy between random walk and
uniform sampling has been well studied [12]. One may ap-
proximate the consecutive random walk steps with indepen-
dent sampling from a uniform distribution of the nodes in
the system. The precision of approximation depends on the
underlying network connectivity (i.e. the spectral gap of a
graph). Since the typical OSN topologies exhibit properties
that guarantee a large average degree [10], it is appropriate
to approximate the question-forwarding strategy with uniform
sampling in our context. Therefore, we approximate the dis-
tribution of the privacy exposure of a referral session with the
Geometric distribution, and the expectation is 1/qi. That is,
PED(i) =
∞∑
j=1
j · (1− qi)j−1qi
=
1
qi
(6)
where qi is the probability of finding an answer for question
i at one particular step.
Thus, our problem is, given E , to minimize
PED(E ,R) = 1
m
·
m∑
i=1
1
qi
(7)
with the capacity constraint of nodes’ awareness towards their
neighbors (Eqn. (3)).
By substituting (1) into (7), we obtain
PED(E ,R) = 1
m
·
m∑
i=1
1
1− (1− ei)(1− riei)d (8)
In this paper, we assume ei  1, which allows us to simplify
the derivation by omitting e2i and other higher order items in
Eqn. (8). A similar assumption is also made in [12] [13]. The
approximation lead to a suboptimal solution to the original
optimization problem. To minimize the privacy exposure de-
gree of the system, we need to solve the following constrained
optimization problem
minimize PED(E ,R) = 1
m
·
m∑
i=1
1
(1 + rid)ei
(9)
s.t.
m∑
i=1
ri = c and 0 < ri, ei < 1 (10)
where i = 1, ...,m. The inequality in the constraint (10) is
due to the physical limitation of the awareness level and expert
density.
We can solve this problem with the Lagrangian multipliers
method [14]. The Lagrangian of the above problem is given
by
Λ(R, λ) = 1
m
·
m∑
i=1
1
(1 + rid)ei
+ λ(
m∑
i=1
ri − c)
Thus, we obtain
1 + rid =
√
d
λmei
(11)
Combining (11) and the constraint (10), we can determine the
nodes’ optimal awareness distribution
ri = (
m
d
+ c) ·
√
1
ei∑m
j=1
√
1
ej
− 1
d
, i = 1, ...,m (12)
and we obtain the distribution rule (4). Furthermore, we can
derive the suboptimal value of PED(E ,R) with the above
awareness distribution by combining Eqns. (1) and (7), and
PEDmin =
1
m(m + dc)
·
( m∑
i=1
√
1
ei
)2
. (13)
Eqns. (12) present the optimal distribution of nodes’ aware-
ness level for a practical situation where the expert density on
any question is far less than 1. We can see that the nodes’
optimal awareness distribution over a posed questions is in-
versely proportional to the square root of the corresponding
expert density in the system. Consider two posed questions i
and k, we have
ri
rk
∝
√
ek
ei
.
This shows that the optimal awareness distribution favors
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questions on which there are fewer experts in the system (e.g.
if ei < ek, then ri > rk).
Nash equilibrium. In the above analysis, we regard the
capacity of nodes’ awareness towards their neighbors as a
constant. In order to reduce the system’s privacy exposure to
its minimum, each node need to contribute as much of its
awareness as possible. However, in a practical system, certain
nodes may not be willing to contribute their awareness up to
the capacity, and we are interested in the stable social norm
in the system. Here, we maintain the objective function in the
problem (9) and relax the constraint (10) slightly. That is,
s.t.
m∑
i=1
ri ≤ c and 0 < ri, ei < 1 (14)
LEMMA 1. To minimize the system’s privacy exposure,
all nodes in the system are required to contribute up to the
capacity of their awareness towards their neighbors.
Proof: Suppose that certain nodes do not contribute their
awareness up to the capacity, namely,
∑m
i=1 ri = c
∗ ≤ c.
Denote by R∗ = [r∗1 , r∗2 , ..., r∗m] the optimal distribution
of nodes’ awareness level defined by Eqns. (12), and by
combining Eqn. (13) we obtain
PED∗min =
1
m(m + dc∗)
·
( m∑
i=1
√
1
ei
)2
≥ PEDmin.
We can see that the system with R∗ incurs higher privacy
exposure.
From Eqns. (12), we are informed of the uniqueness of
the optimal distribution of node’s awareness level. Together
with Lemma 1, we can immediately arrive at the following
conclusion.
THEOREM 2. The optimal distribution of nodes’ aware-
ness level that minimizes the system’s privacy exposure degree
constitutes the unique Nash equilibrium.
B. Performance bound
With the heterogenous setting of d in the system, the single
step success rate of a referral session differs at each step.
Therefore it is difficult to obtain the closed-form solution.
In this section, we study the upper and lower bounds of
the system’s minimal privacy exposure degree PEDmin with
heterogeneous settings of d.
THEOREM 3. For nodes with heterogeneous d, given the
expert density distribution E , they system’s minimal privacy
exposure degree PEDmin is bounded by
PEDmin ≥ 1
m(m + cdmax)
·
( m∑
i=1
√
1
ei
)2
,
PEDmin ≤ 1
m(m + cdmin)
·
( m∑
i=1
√
1
ei
)2
.
(15)
where dmin = min(du) and dmax = max(du), u ∈ N .
Proof: From Eqn. (1) we know qi is an increasing
OSN Orkut LiveJournal
Number of nodes 3,072,441 5,284,457
Estimated crawled fraction 11.3% 95.4%
Number of links 223,534,301 77,402,652
Av. no. of friends per node 106.1 16.97
Fraction of symmetric links 100.0% 73.5%
TABLE I
STATISTICS OF THE OSN DATASETS [10].
function with respect to du. Thus, ∀u ∈ N ,
qmin(i) ≤ qi ≤ qmax(i), (16)
where qmin(i) and qmax(i) correspond to the single step
success rate with du = dmin and du = dmax, respectively.
We compare the referral session of heterogeneous d with two
other referral sessions that are characterized by homogeneous
single step success rates of qmin(i) and qmax(i). Denote by
PED(i)U and PED(i)L the privacy exposure degrees of
two referral sessions for question i with homogeneous setting
of dmin and dmax, respectively. From (16), we obtain ∀i,
1 ≤ i ≤ m,
PED(i)L ≤ PED(i) ≤ PED(i)U (17)
Consider the linear combination of the system’s average
privacy exposure degree for the m posed questions, we can
obtain, for any E and R,
1
m
·
m∑
i=1
PED(i)L ≤ 1
m
·
m∑
i=1
PED(i) ≤ 1
m
·
m∑
i=1
PED(i)U ,
which can be written as
PEDL ≤ PED ≤ PEDU . (18)
Since (18) holds for any distribution of node’s awareness level
R, we can obtain
min PEDL ≤ PEDmin ≤ min PEDU .
According to Eqn. (5), we obtain the performance bound (15).
IV. EVALUATION
In this section, we study empirically the privacy exposure of
referral sessions in the system, based on our modeled referring
strategy. We utilize the connectivity data of a set of OSNs,
namely Orkut, LiveJournal, collected by Mislove et al. [10].
Orkut is a website of explicitly defined social network to help
people make new friends and maintain existing relationships.
LiveJournal is an online social network of bloggers. The major
statistics of these datasets are summarized in Table I. We
believe it is more realistic to evaluate the system on these
real social network data2. Since the networks are too big for
evaluation, we sample several different portions from each
network with Snowball sampling [15], and the size of the
sampled networks is set to 1× 104.
2Utilizing datasets from actual OSS applications such as Aardvark (which
is based on Facebook) would be ideal, but those datasets are unavailable since
Facebook prohibits automated crawlers.
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(a) Varying awareness level (b) Varying expert density
Fig. 1. Privacy exposure degree of a single referral session.
Figure 1(a) and Figure 1(b) show the privacy exposure
degree of a single referral session with varying awareness
level r and expert density e, respectively. The results are
obtained as averages of 1000 simulation runs. They illustrate
the performance improvement as r or e increases. We can see
that the privacy exposure degree of a single referral session
decreases as r or e increases, matching our previous analysis.
We also observe that the resulting performance from Orkut is
better than that from LiveJournal.
We further study the effect of node’s awareness distribution
on the system’s overall privacy exposure. In the simulation,
20 questions are randomly posed, and we select 20 different
pairs of (e, r) according to Eqn. (12) (referred to as Square-
root distribution), with e = 5 × 10−4, 1 × 10−3, ..., 1 × 10−2
(20 values with increment of 5× 10−4). For comparison, we
also generate 20 random values of r subject to the capacity
constraint (3) (referred to as Random distribution). Figure 2(a)
shows the results under the two awareness level distributions
based on a 5-regular graph of 1× 104 nodes. The x-axis rep-
resents the awareness capacity c. We can see that the system’s
privacy exposure degree with the Square-root distribution of
r is smaller than that with the Random distribution of r.
This verifies Theorem 1 that the Square-root distribution of r
incurs the minimal privacy exposure. In addition, we observe
that the performance improves as c increases, which matches
our analysis. Figure 2(b) presents the simulation results under
the two OSN datasets. Again, we observe that the system’s
privacy exposure degree from Orkut is smaller than that from
Livejournal. Note that the Orkut dataset has higher average
degree than that of LiveJournal. This leads us to an empirical
conclusion: the network connectivity, characterized by the
average degree, is negatively related to the system’s privacy
exposure degree (i.e. positively related to the performance).
(a) Different distributions of r (b) Different OSN datasets
Fig. 2. The system’s privacy exposure degree (m = 20).
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we study the privacy exposure problem of
OSS. We utilize random walk to model a node’s referring
behavior, adjusted by the node’s awareness of the potential
expertise of its neighbors. We derive the optimal distribution of
nodes’ awareness level, which minimizes the system’s privacy
exposure degree, and prove it constitutes the unique Nash
equilibrium. The analysis shows that the optimal distribution
over a posed question is inversely proportional to the square
root of the corresponding expert density. In addition, we
present the performance bounds of the system’s minimal
privacy exposure degree with heterogeneous settings on the
number of a node’s contacts. The evaluation based on crawled
data of several OSNs validates our analysis. Our model is a
first step to analytically study the OSS system. In the future,
we would like to develop tools to capture the users’ awareness
of their friends’ expertise. In addition, we currently assume
the homogeneous setting that answers from multiple experts
on a question are the same, and it would be interesting to
study response filtering considering the system’s trust [16] and
reputation [17] mechanisms, which are closely related to the
system’s privacy exposure.
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